scale of -2.5 to 2.5. 3 And Freedom House's Nations in Transit likewise scores Russia poorly for corruption, giving it a rating of 5.75 in 2003 on its scale of 1 to 7, in which 7 is the worst. 4 Affi rming these rankings, leaders inside and outside the country have identifi ed corruption control as a pressing need, although the sincerity of their commitment to reform may be questionable. 5 While Russia has signed the UN Convention against Corruption (2003) and the Council of Europe's Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (1999), it has not ratifi ed these documents or brought its national legislation into compliance with them. 6 Current anticorruption programs target lowlevel offi cials, while leaving higher-level fi gures untouched. Charges of corruption in Russia tend to be a political weapon wielded by one side against another to gain advantage in elections. The insiders who benefi t from corrupt practices have little interest in ending them.
While cross-national surveys point to a serious corruption problem, they provide little more than a superfi cial picture of a country as large and diverse as the Russian Federation. To make up for this shortcoming, in 2002 TI and the Information for Democracy Foundation (INDEM) conducted a survey of forty regions that provides the fi rst effort to measure differences in the perceptions and incidence of corruption across the Russian regions. 7 The survey demonstrates that there is extensive variation at the regional level. Given this variation, some regions might point the way to reducing corruption in Russia and, for that reason alone, this unique data set deserves greater analysis and attention.
Variation in levels of corruption across the regions is not surprising. Each of the regions inherited a different industrial legacy from the Soviet period. Moreover, the collapse of the Soviet Union led to extensive decentralization in Russia, giving the eighty-nine Russian regions the opportunity to travel different trajectories in political and economic terms. From the mid-1990s until the end of 2004, voters in the regions directly elected governors who largely set the tone for their regions. The result has been a divergence in political and economic regimes. 8 Nevertheless, most regions shared a common backdrop of governance problems. Governors took advantage of weak accountability structures and a climate of uncertainty to profi t from their positions. At the same time, law enforcement agencies, schools, and the health care system experienced extensive problems with corruption. 9 Regional offi cials and large companies often controlled regional media, allowing them to discuss the problem in general but blocking analysis of concrete cases that affected their interests.
In an effort to reimpose control from above and assert greater homogeneity in the Russian regions, President Vladimir Putin introduced a new system in early 2005 by which he appoints governors with the approval of regional legislatures. Whether this policy will have its intended effect remains to be seen. Nevertheless, Putin's decision to end Russia's experiment in electing governors did not provoke mass protests from the citizens, partly because many of them had a dim view of Russia's regional democratic institutions as they functioned during the 1990s and during Putin's fi rst term. 10 The overall fi nding of differences in the levels of corruption across the regions raises several interesting research questions. What factors explain these differences? Would theories used to explain corruption in other contexts, such as Southeast Asia, tell us something useful about Russia? How can Russia design an anticorruption policy that is truly effective rather than simply promoting the interests of particular politicians at election time? 
DEFINITION OF CORRUPTION
The defi nition of corruption has received a great deal of attention in academic circles. 11 Although the notion that corruption is culturally relative has worked against universal defi nitions, many scholars and practitioners have nonetheless adopted a minimalist defi nition of corruption as the abuse of public offi ce for private gain.
12 This defi nition paraphrases Nye's oft-cited characterization: "Corruption is behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding infl uence."
13 Although TI/INDEM researchers do not include a defi nition of corruption in their analysis of the Russian regions, the international movement TI does employ this defi nition and we use it in our analysis here.
THEORIES TO EXPLAIN VARIATIONS IN CORRUPTION
ACROSS RUSSIAN REGIONS A number of theories may explain the variation in corruption across the Russian regions. For analytical clarity, we divide these theories into two families of causation. The fi rst group of theories is economic. The fi rst economic theory we examine focuses on the level of development. Studies of corruption emphasize the importance of this variable in explaining different levels of corruption across countries, and it may be important in explaining regional differences within a country, too. Another variable in this family is the presence of natural resources, as theory suggests that countries rich in natural resources have greater opportunities for rent seeking and therefore face more governance challenges.
The second group of theories looks at political issues. In this group, the size of government is one possible explanation for corruption. Theory suggests that a larger state may engender more corruption because of the greater opportunities for abuse of offi ce. Another theory in the family 11 See, for example, most of the chapters in Arnold J. Heidenheimer, ed., Political Corruption: Readings suggests that imbalances of power between the state and the business sector may explain higher levels of corruption because such imbalances inhibit one party from acting as a check on the other's behavior. Another variable in this family is accountability, which theory suggests will lower corruption levels. Our analysis uses voter turnout and the level of media freedom as measures for getting at political and civil aspects of accountability. We do not include in our analysis variables that may infl uence corruption levels but that do not vary signifi cantly across the Russian regions. Most notably, cross-country analyses have found that prior experience with democracy, 15 British colonial heritage, 16 and progressive structural reforms 17 contribute to lower levels of corruption, but these do not apply to our study.
We turn now to a more detailed discussion of how these general economic and political theories apply to the Russian context.
ECONOMIC THEORIES
In this section, we consider two economic explanations for corruption. The fi rst examines the role of economic development in reducing corruption, which cross-country studies of corruption have shown is signifi cant. In Treisman's cross-national study, for example, economic development explained between half and three-quarters of the variation in perceived corruption indexes, depending on which set of indexes he used. 18 In our analysis, we therefore include a variable for the level of regional economic development (GRP/capita in 1999). 19 We hypothesize that higher levels of development reduce the incentives to public offi cials to resort to corruption because more resources make possible better-paid jobs 20 and longer time horizons due to a more stable environment. 21 These factors reduce an offi cial's fi nancial need to engage in corruption and increase the cost of losing one's job if caught. Eco-nomic development also makes available more resources to implement and maintain the monitoring and oversight of government activities, thereby deterring corruption. 22 At the same time, economic development improves prospects for advancement in the market and thereby eases the pressure for business to pursue wealth through corruption. 23 Higher levels of development also increase education and literacy and thereby facilitate the ability of citizens to serve as watchdogs over offi cials' activities.
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In our attempt to explain differing levels of corruption across the Russian regions, we also include a variable for the presence of natural resources. The assumption here is that more natural resources create more opportunities for rent seeking and reduce the imperative to create a strong institutional framework for economic growth.
25 When Jin tested this hypothesis across 127 countries, he found that oil production did increase the level of corruption but diamond production did not; he surmised that these different effects might be caused by the characteristics of individual countries because only a handful of countries produce both of these resources. 26 The World Bank examined this relationship across transition economies and concluded that state capture has been more prevalent in countries well endowed with natural resources. 27 Because Russia is rich in natural resources that are distributed unevenly across the regions, we include this variable in our analysis to see if it may explain regional differences in corruption levels. To estimate the natural resource endowment of Russia's 89 regions, we follow Popov in calculating the amount of industrial production from the electricity, fuel, and ferrous and nonferrous metals sectors for each region.
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POLITICAL THEORIES In this section, we look at political explanations for regional differences in corruption levels. First, we examine the theory that larger states afford more opportunities for corruption. 29 30 One problem with these measures is the possibility that causality runs in the opposite direction with the opposite sign. That is, we can imagine higher levels of corruption contributing to a public sector that collects fewer taxes and spends less, on the one hand, and whose state-owned enterprises produce less, on the other.
We use a different measure of state size: the number of bureaucrats in each region. This measure gives a good proxy for the number of opportunities that exist for offi cials to engage in corruption, as more people and more jobs mean more opportunities for bribes, extortion, and other corrupt acts. Larger bureaucracies also mean larger public contracts, which can attract corruption schemes. Segal notes, for example, that the New York public school system, the largest in the United States, spends $2 billion a year on supplies, over $60 million on textbooks, $40 million on leases, and $300 million on private preschool vendors-and has faced recurrent corruption problems. 31 Larger bureaucracies can also work against effective oversight, especially where they are complex and structured in multiple layers.
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The number of bureaucrats is an absolute measure of state size and not relative to the size of the population. That is, we are positing bureaucrats and not bureaucrats per capita as an explanatory variable. The latter might be a useful measure of bureaucratic density if all regions had the same number of people. But where the regions are of greatly different sizes, the number of bureaucrats per capita does not represent the size of the state for our purposes. Rather, the ratio of bureaucrats to population increases in less populated areas, as small towns and regions need offi cial representatives of various agencies, administrations, and legislatures. Novgorod, with a population of 694,700, has eight bureaucrats per thousand people, for example, whereas St. Petersburg, with a population of 4,669,400, has only four bureaucrats per thousand people. Yet we hypothesize that the complexity and larger contracts connected with the 18,855 bureaucrats in St. Petersburg are more likely to be a source of corruption than the 5,746 bureaucrats in Novgorod. To test this, we also include a variable for bureaucrats per thousand people in our regression model. Russia's State Statistics Committee published the number of public sector offi cials in each of the Russian regions for 2002. 33 For our analysis, we use a combined fi gure of federal, regional, and local offi cials working in each region. This fi gure includes the number of staff members working in the regional legislatures, regional employees of the presidential administration (including the staff of the seven presidential envoys to the regions), the prime minister's offi ce, federal ministries and agencies, employees of the regional executive branch administrations, court and procurator employees in the regions (both judges and support staff ), and employees of other agencies, such as electoral commissions and audit chambers. The number does not include employees of the law enforcement and security agencies. 34 Our use of the number of bureaucrats as an explanatory variable precludes our use of population size, as the two variables are highly correlated. In fact, our data show a correlation of .938 between these two variables. While some scholars have posited a link between population size and corruption, hypothesizing that larger populations inhibit the formation of social networks and the potential monitoring of deviant behavior, 35 we believe it is not the lack of monitoring in a more populous society but rather in a larger bureaucracy that contributes to higher levels of corruption. We test our hypothesis by including population size in our regression model.
Our second political variable to explain levels of corruption focuses on imbalances of power between the state and the business sector. Theory suggests that levels of corruption increase when there are imbalances of power between these groups because one party has monopoly power over the other. dispersed the business sector is and by how coherent or fractured the state is. He argues that (1) countries characterized by state capture (fractured state, concentrated business community) or a predatory state (coherent state, dispersed business sector) have the highest levels of corruption, 37 (2) countries characterized by a competitive market (fractured state, dispersed business) have the lowest levels of corruption, and (3) countries characterized as mutual hostages (coherent states, concentrated business) have corruption levels that fall somewhere in between. (See Table 1 .)
It should be noted, however, that not only the four corruption scenarios predicted by the model but also other outcomes are possible. For example, a coherent state combined with a dispersed business sector could lead to a developmental, rather than a "predatory" state, if the political leader chose to use the abilities of the state to ensure the peaceful development of all business groups. The model simply suggests that this outcome is less likely.
Applying this model to the Russian context allows us to test how well it travels from Southeast Asia to other parts of the world. Potentially, the theory will be useful in illuminating what is happening in Russia. However, the Russian experience could prove to be different from what the theory would predict and could therefore lead to a revision or extension of the theory.
Not surprisingly, it is diffi cult to apply these simplifi ed characterizations to extremely complicated countries or regions. Even Kang had trouble applying his own criteria to the case of Taiwan. Recognizing such limitations, we try to apply this analysis to the forty Russian regions for which we have corruption data.
Following Kang, "a state is coherent if it can formulate preferences independent of social infl uences and if political leaders have internal control over their bureaucrats." 38 The most coherent situations exist when political leaders have full control over their political organizations and state employees so they can use domestic politics to ensure their continued rule. At the other end of the spectrum, the most fractured situation occurs when "leaders survive only tenuously, when they engage in constant confl ict with political organizations over the form and content of the state and bureaucrats can play off 'multiple principles' to their own advantage. At the heart is the question of control."
Kang defi nes a strong, concentrated business sector as one including diversifi ed business groups, "comprised of well-organized fi rms that cover many sectors of the economy." The companies may have subsidiaries that are import competing and others that are export oriented, and these may have agricultural and urban fi rms. 39 Following Kang, these larger business groups are more likely to attempt to wield political infl uence by infl uencing government policy.
Characterizing the state-business relationship in the Russian regions is extremely diffi cult because it is hard to obtain consistent data across regions. Nevertheless, we were able to compare state cohesiveness across a wide number of regions by employing a broad-gauge comparative technique that counts the number of veto players. 40 Andrew MacIntyre used veto players to study government effectiveness in Southeast Asia. He defi ned such players as "an individual or collective actor that has the institutionalized power to defeat a proposed law by withholding formal approval." 41 He found a variety of systems across the countries he studied: Indonesia with one veto player in the form of the president and Malaysia with one veto player in the form of a particular political party had concentrated political systems, whereas the Philippines with three veto players and Thailand with six had fragmented political systems.
To apply this technique to the Russian regions, the defi nition must be relaxed a little. Rather than focusing on formal legislation, which is not always crucial to governance in Russia, it makes more sense to concentrate on the power of the executive. Operationally, then, the question becomes: can the governor freely implement his policies, whether in the terms of executive decrees or regional legislation, or are there regional veto players who can block his actions? Using this approach makes it possible to classify the forty regions we examine as having either a "coherent" or a "fractured" state. In this context, a coherent state 39 Ibid., 14. 40 is one in which the governor does not face any serious regional veto players, while a fractured state is one in which power is more widely distributed and the governor faces opposition. Making such judgments requires gathering extensive amounts of information on the regions and distilling it in a concise way to place a region in one category or the other. Such information can be found in the issues of the Russian Regional Report dating back to 1996, 42 the summary volume The Republics and Regions of the Russian Federation: A Guide to Politics, Policies, and Leaders, and the rankings of regional leaders compiled by Rostislav Turovskii. 43 Thus, for example, it is possible to categorize Russia's major cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg, which also have the status of being two of Russia's eighty-nine constituent regions, in terms of the number of veto players. In Moscow the mayor is the only veto player since he does not have any diffi culty implementing his policies and the city council largely serves as a rubber stamp. Moscow is labeled "coherent." The St. Petersburg governor, by contrast, faces a strong, independent legislature that can effectively block his or her actions. In 2003 Governor Vladimir Yakovlev was unable to force the city legislature to rewrite the city charter so that he could stand for a third term. Since there are at least two veto players in the city, the region is labeled "fractured."
Moving to the economic sphere, we defi ned the regional business communities as concentrated if there were several big companies operating in the region. We labeled them dispersed if only small and generally local companies were present. 44 Business-state relations in the regions vary considerably (see Table  2 ). Of the forty regions we examined, thirteen fell into the mutual hostages category and four fell into the competitive market category. The others were defi ned as either state capture or predatory state. The theory predicts that (1) the regions in the state-capture or predatory-state categories would have higher levels of corruption, (2) the regions in the competitive-market category would have relatively low corruption, and (3) The other political variables we use to explain levels of corruption concern the level of accountability-with more democratic regimes generally being less corrupt than authoritarian ones. As stressed by Rose-Ackerman, "Combining an informed and concerned electorate with a political process that regularly produces closely contested elections leads to a world in which corruption is limited by competition." 45 Our measures for political accountability include voter turnout and freedom of the press. 45 Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption: A Study in Political Economy (New York: Academic Press, 1978), 213. When turnout is higher in an election, more citizens are exercising their check on leaders and bolstering this mechanism of vertical accountability. Voter turnout is a better indicator of political accountability, however, where there are meaningful choices among political candidates and where voters are informed and not subject to intimidation. 46 To measure voter turnout, we relied on fi gures for the gubernatorial elections held in the forty regions during [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] . 47 Using the gubernatorial elections allows us to measure directly the extent of the electoral restraints at the regional level.
CO RRU P T I O N I N T H E RUSSIAN RE
A related measure of accountability is freedom of the press. Crossnationally, countries with freer presses are less likely to face extensive corruption because a free press provides greater accountability. The Free Media Institute Free Media Index provided a measure of press freedom for each region in Russia in the year 2000 that can be analyzed in conjunction with the corruption data. 48 This index comprises three components: (1) ability to search for and receive information, focusing on the openness of the authorities and the ease with which journalists can receive accreditation; (2) freedom to produce information, including local licensing and tax laws; and (3) freedom to distribute information, which focuses on the conditions the authorities set for establishing a monopoly of information. The information was gathered by analyzing regional media legislation, the procedures necessary to receive a journalist's accreditation, the local media market (number of publications and broadcasters, audiences, and print runs), and the results of a test request for information from various regional offi cials that must be provided according to law.
One major methodological problem, though, is that working with media freedom data under Russian conditions is extremely tricky. Ordinarily, one would expect freer media to be strongly correlated with a less corrupt society since the media are able to provide greater social accountability. However, in an authoritarian system state-controlled media may be able to produce corruption-perception survey results that suggest that there is less perceived corruption. Political leaders in authoritarian societies exploit the media to signal to the population what its members should say and think about their own society. The media would naturally report the offi cial claim that there is no corruption, and individuals, when confronted with a questionnaire presented by a stranger, would be likely to repeat the offi cial line out of fear of being punished for deviating from the wishes of the leadership.
Thus, in Russia it would be logical to fi nd low levels of perceived corruption in regions with tightly controlled media. Likewise, one might also fi nd high levels of perceived corruption in regions with freer media, since the public in those regions is more informed about the corruption in the region but might not be in a strong enough position to do something about it.
Increasingly, the Russian federal media are coming under state control and are less free to provide real oversight of government policymaking. In 2002 Freedom House shifted its evaluation of the Russian media from "partly free" to "not free" because the Kremlin had taken control of the country's three national television networks.
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Governors often exercise control over regional media in the same way that the Kremlin manages to control the national media. At the regional level, however, there are sometimes competing business interests that are able to fund alternative media. While none of the resulting media outlets strive for unbiased objectivity, they at least provide alternative points of view, allowing their audience access to a variety of opinions.
CORRUPTION DATA
We use the data released by Transparency International and the Information for Democracy Foundation (INDEM) on October 9, 2002, as an indicator of corruption in the forty regions that they examined. The TI/INDEM data remain the only systematic study of the perceptions and incidence of corruption in Russia's regions. 50 The forty regions surveyed are generally representative of Russia's eighty-nine regions, including a mix of ethnic Russian regions and non-Russian regions, rich and poor regions, and regions across the country from west to east. They were chosen by a group of experts convened by Transparency International, picking regions from each of the seven federal districts into which Russia is currently divided. Overall, the regions included in the survey accounted for 73 percent of the population, and the populations surveyed were geographically representative of the seven federal districts. 50 The data have already had a useful impact in Russia, where they have drawn analytical attention to the issue of corruption among policymakers and the public. The regional data angered some governors to the extent that they destroyed the print run of the newspapers containing them, according to INDEM Table 3 .) The one exception was the Urals district, which has only six regions and therefore slightly skewed numbers. Unfortunately, funds were not available for surveys in all eighty-nine regions.
Missing from the sample are the small autonomous okrugs, which make up only a tiny fraction of Russia's population. These units are a strange feature of Russia's "matroshka federalism" because they are simultaneously independent regions and parts of larger regions. The survey organizers excluded them so that all the regions would be selfstanding entities. Also excluded were the non-ethnic Russian republics of the North Caucasus, such as Chechnya, Dagestan, and Ingushetia, though the ethnic Russian regions of Krasnodar, Rostov, and Stavropol are included. The study organizers chose not to include the nonRussian North Caucasus republics out of concern that conditions there were not safe enough to conduct polls. The regions not included are somewhat exceptional due to the ethnic dimensions of their societies and high levels of confl ict.
In the excluded regions, one would expect to fi nd high levels of corruption since these regions are typically ruled by clan leaders who preside over extensive bureaucracies. Given the widespread violence, however, there would be little assurance in any event that survey respondents would be willing to speak openly about their personal experience with the problem. Voter turnout in regions like these tends to be high, but such rates are more likely due to coerced voting and falsifi cation than to actual participation. 51 Compared with the rest of the regions in Russia, the missing regions typically have lower GRP Transparency International and INDEM surveyed 5,666 citizens and 1,838 representatives of small and medium-size enterprises in the forty regions 52 using assessment questions and questions about personal experiences with corruption. Assessment questions asked, for example, "How would you estimate the level of corruption in the following institutions?" For authorities from different levels and branches of government (such as the law enforcement agencies, security service, cabinet, Duma, and Federation Council), respondents assigned an evaluation of honest, somewhat honest, somewhat dishonest, dishonest, or don't know. 53 To evaluate people's experience with corruption, the surveys asked questions such as: "How frequently do residents of your region encounter corruption?" to which respondents answered (1) constantly, (2) from time to time, or (3) very seldom; or "When did you have to informally infl uence an offi cial using a bribe, gift, service, etc. in order to solve a problem facing your business?" to which respondents answered (1) less than a week ago, (2) from a week to a month ago, (3) from a month to six months ago, and (4) more than six months ago. Based on responses to a series of such questions, TI/INDEM compiled an index of the perception of corruption and an index of the amount of corruption.
Interestingly, there is a low level of correlation (.33) between the composite TI/INDEM index measuring people's overall perception of the level of corruption and the index relying on experienced-based information. This probably refl ects distortions in perceptions caused by state-controlled media, which may not report on corruption problems, or distortions in reported perceptions attributable to levels of fear, which may cause some respondents to evaluate their government more positively. The low correlation may also refl ect people's expectations and points of reference, which color their perceptions independent of their experience. 52 Although the researchers claimed that this sample size was unprecedented, it did not meet sample size requirements in all regions, making some of the fi ndings indicative but not statistically significant. 53 For a critical analysis of using perception-based data in regard to the Russian regions, see Viktor V. Luneev, "Indeksy korruptsii," Organizovannaia prestupnost', terrorizm, i korruptsiia, no. 1 (2003), 126-28; and Endre Sik, "The Bad, the Worse and the Worst: Guesstimating the Level of Corruption," in Kotkin and Sajó (fn. 5).
In fact, the perception scores for Bashkortostan and Karelia confi rm these explanations. Bashkortostan ranks as the cleanest region in the TI/INDEM perception index, and it has an extremely authoritarian leadership and state-controlled media that rarely, if ever, discuss the problem of corruption in the region: people in the region either are unaware of the problem or, more likely, are afraid to mention it to survey takers. When asked about their experiences with corruption, however, respondents in Bashkortostan presented a more critical view of their government, with a lower ranking of 6 out of 40 on the index. Likewise, the republic of Karelia, in Russia's northwest, has one of the highest levels of perceived corruption in the survey (ranked 36 out of 40), but the lowest reported amount of corruption (ranked 1 out of 40). Here, the problem is that the region borders with Finland, so the respondents probably compare themselves with their foreign neighbors, concluding that they must have a relatively large amount of corruption since their local situation seems much worse than that in Finland.
In our regression, we use the index of the amount of corruption as our dependent variable for two reasons. First, the TI/INDEM index of corruption perception pertains to federal, regional and local authorities and so constitutes a rather noisy measure of the different levels of corruption across the Russian regions. The index of actual experiences of corruption, in contrast, focuses exclusively on regional problems. Second, survey work has shown that experience-based information captures less subjectivity than perception-based information. Given the problem with media freedom and points of reference discussed above, we regard the TI/INDEM index of the amount of corruption as a better proxy for our dependent variable. This index aggregates citizens' and entrepreneurs' responses to the following characteristics of corruption: (1) the share of respondents stating that they have given a bribe at least once; (2) the share of respondents stating that they gave a bribe the last time they felt they had to do so; (3) the average annual number of bribes local residents paid to offi cials; (4) the average amount of the bribe; (5) the total annual amount of bribes paid by local residents; and (6) the total annual amount of bribes as a percentage of the gross regional product. The index assigns a 0 to the region demonstrating the smallest amount of corruption and a 1 to the region demonstrating the maximal value of corruption. 54 Admittedly, this measure of corruption is incomplete. The index of the amount of corruption focuses on bribes in such situations as health care, traffi c violations, and higher education, and does not include other kinds of corruption, such as asset stripping by offi cials or state capture by corrupt networks. As Karklins points out, this kind of everyday bribery may cause less political damage than other kinds of corruption. 55 While the ideal measure of corruption would include all types of corruption, we would then need to examine whether these different kinds of corruption are attributable to the same underlying causes or whether instead they appear under different circumstances. Given the data at hand, we are spared this exercise. For this analysis, we need only assume that the theoretical explanations of corruption outlined above apply to the bribes paid by individuals and businesses in their dealings with the government.
There is also the question of whether the data described here accurately measure the actual level of corruption in the various Russian regions. Respondents may be less than candid in discussing whether they have given bribes, since doing so is a criminal offense. However, the Russian national media, including television, have discussed the problem of corruption at length, making corruption an issue widely acknowledged by politicians at all levels. It is now a normal part of Russian discourse. Indeed, the survey authors assert that "Russian citizens are rather open as concerns surveys of everyday petty corruption and think it their duty to tell about their corruption experiences supposing it will be useful for senior authorities." 56 Table 4 shows the TI/INDEM scores for the amount of corruption in each region. The index for the amount of corruption ranges from a low of 0.000 in Karelia and 0.010 in Yaroslavl to a high of 1.000 in Moscow Oblast and 0.929 in Nizhnii Novgorod, suggesting that there is relatively more corruption in Russia's large urban centers than in more outlying northern regions, where cities are smaller. The scores for other regions are fairly evenly distributed across this spectrum, with twenty-two regions falling in the lower half of the index and eighteen regions in the top half. When these scores are projected on a map of the regions, a geographical pattern emerges. Survey responses indicate that the southern regions are more corrupt than the northern regions. This "southern belt" comprises the old agricultural procommunist regions, which stretched from the Rostov Oblast to the Volga region. However, the data reveal a problem with three regions in particular. Given what is generally known about Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Primorskii Krai, one would expect to see high levels of corruption. Yet the data used here show low levels of corruption for these regions. We speculate that reported corruption levels are low in these regions because people are afraid to give an honest assessment of the problem and journalists treat the topic of corruption with circumspection. In Bashkortostan and Tatarstan people would be afraid to speak critically of the government because their regions are two of the most authoritarian in Russia. 57 The federal government allows the leaders in these regions to maintain a strong-arm rule in order to avoid the possibility of ethnic unrest, which is less likely in other regions. In Primorskii Krai, it is not an authoritarian government but the dominance of criminal elements that explains people's reluctance to discuss corruption. 58 The local economy of Primorskii Krai is separated from European Russia by the vast expanse of Siberia and is largely dependent on fi shing, logging, and importing cars from Japan, activities that frequently take place on the black market. To ensure that these three regions do not have an undue impact on our analysis, we will run our model an additional time excluding them to test the validity of our results.
Before proceeding to the regression analysis, we present the summary statistics for our explanatory variables in Table 5 . For the forty regions in our study, the GRP per capita ranges from a low of 13.1 million rubles in Altai Krai to a high of 110.5 million rubles in Tyumen, with a relatively low mean of 26.7 million rubles. The measure of natural resource possession refl ects the amount of energy and metal production in each region, ranging from 3.2 billion rubles in Pskov Oblast to 635.7 billion rubles in Tyumen Oblast. The number of bureaucrats in each region ranges from a low of 5,621 in Karelia to a high of 34,479 in Moscow City with a mean of 14,236. The population size ranges from 720,000 in Novgorod to 8.55 million in Moscow City, with a mean of 2.65 million. The coding for the balance of power between business and the state (following Kang) is represented by three dummy variables (0 or 1) representing the categories of state capture, predatory state, and competitive market. Voter turnout ranges from a low of 25 percent in Leningrad Oblast to a high of 79 
THE RESULTS
This analysis uses ordinary least square estimates for each region. 59 Altogether, the independent variables in the regression account for nearly 50 percent of the variation in the levels of corruption across the forty Russian regions. (See Table 6 .) As the coeffi cients table shows, however, two of the variables explain the majority of this variation, as they have the largest standardized coeffi cients and are statistically significant. These two variables-the per capita gross regional product and the number of bureaucrats-alone explain 46 percent of the variation 59 We chose ordinary least square estimates because they are effi cient with small numbers of cases and are easy to interpret. in corruption. 60 This result gives strong support for these two explanations of corruption.
When we removed Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Primorskii Krai from the analysis, our main fi ndings were even stronger. As Table 7 shows, the R square increases from .48 to .54, and the coeffi cients and statistical signifi cance for the number of bureaucrats increased somewhat, though the signifi cance of GRP per capita dropped slightly. Overall, this analysis suggests that the three unusual regions are not unduly infl uencing our results.
With a standardized coeffi cient of .834, the number of bureaucrats has the largest impact on corruption levels in our model. Controlling for other variables, when the number of bureaucrats increases by one thousand, the amount of corruption, which ranges from 0.000 to 1.000, increases by .037 on average. To illustrate, this change would represent a shift in the amount of corruption reported in Volgograd to that in St.
Petersburg. This fi nding confi rms our hypothesis that large numbers of bureaucrats of the type found in Russia inhibit oversight and afford more opportunities for corruption.
To confi rm that this dynamic is more important than population size, we include both variables in a second regression model. The fi ndings in Table 8 show that the inclusion of the population variable does not notably change the R square, the coeffi cient for the number of bureaucrats (it is .042 instead of .037), or which variables are statistically signifi cant. The population variable, moreover, is not statistically signifi cant.
To confi rm that the number of bureaucrats is more important than bureaucrats per capita, we include both measures in a third regression model. The results in Table 9 show that the number of bureaucrats per capita is a poor predictor of corruption as it is not statistically signifi - cant. In contrast, the absolute number of bureaucrats remains strongly signifi cant. We chose ordinary least square estimates because they are effi cient with small numbers of cases and are easy to interpret. However, we double-checked our regression results using a Tobit model with double censoring to account for the limited range of our dependent variable (which is an index that ranges from 0 to 1). As the output in Table 10 shows, the results we achieved are strikingly similar to the results we achieved with OLS, confi rming the accuracy of these fi ndings. The coeffi cients for the two signifi cant variables were almost identical and the absolute value of the t statistic was slightly larger.
Referring once again to Table 6 , we see that the per capita gross regional product also has a large and statistically signifi cant impact on corruption in the direction predicted by the theory. Controlling for other variables, when per capita gross regional product increases by one thousand rubles, the amount of corruption, which ranges from 0.000 to 1.000 decreases by .010 points on average. This would represent a decrease in the amount of corruption reported in Yaroslavl to that in Karelia. These fi ndings help explain why corruption in Russia is most extreme in the large city areas of Moscow Oblast and Nizhnii Novgorod and in the agricultural south. The large Russian cities have high numbers of bureaucrats, a situation that creates extensive opportunities for, and presumably weaker checks on, corruption. Even though these cities have high levels of development, the negative impact of the bureaucrats outweighs the benefi ts of development. For their part, the regions of the agricultural south, such as Krasnodar, suffer from relatively large numbers of bureaucrats combined with low per capita output and therefore tend to have higher levels of corruption than the average Russian region. Regions like Karelia and Yaroslavl, by contrast, have relatively low corruption because they have benefi ted from relatively high levels of per capita gross regional product and relatively few bureaucrats.
As highlighted by this analysis, the enormous regional concentration of the Russian economy feeds the level of corruption. In 2001 Moscow and Moscow Oblast, regions with some of the highest levels of corruption in the country, accounted for 24.1 percent of Russia's gross regional product. 61 The vast majority of Russia's banking capital is located in the region. Moreover, since many of the country's behemoth corporations are based there and pay their taxes there, economic resources are even further concentrated. 62 The remaining variables in our analysis (natural resources, voter turnout, media freedom, state-business balance) neither approach statistical signifi cance nor have substantial standardized coeffi cients. It is possible, however, that a more detailed analysis of the regions rich in natural resources may detect a link between the presence of these resources and corruption. Within the category of natural resources, fuel and metals, for example, may have a differential impact on corruption levels due to differences in profi tability, state dominance, and foreign participation of these sectors.
We also speculate that a better measure of political accountability might be able to demonstrate an impact on corruption levels. The relationship between political accountability and corruption is extremely complex, and it is possible that the turnout fi gures did not fully measure this dimension. The data on the turnout fi gures for the gubernatorial elections vary wildly from region to region and much depends on the local context. Certainly, Kremlin manipulation of elections and the enormous use by incumbents of offi cial resources to shape election results is turning off Russian voters and giving people the sense that their input into the electoral process is pointless. Moreover, after the September 2004 terrorist attack at Beslan, Putin introduced changes into the Russian political system designed to reduce voter input, including the abolition of direct gubernatorial elections.
Further, we surmise that there is a relationship between media freedom and corruption levels in the Russian context, although our data could not adequately capture the underlying dynamics. We hypothesized, for example, that the relationship between media freedom and reported corruption levels is curvilinear rather than linear: regions with tightly controlled media might generate lower reported levels of corruption because the public is less informed and less willing to make critical statements to a stranger, but after a minimum threshold for media freedom, regions with greater media freedom might generate lower corruption levels because the public is more informed and able to hold leaders at least moderately accountable for their actions. We tested this hypothesis by rescaling the media freedom variable so that the median value is coded 0 (with half the remaining variables negative and the others positive) and then taking the absolute value of that rescaled variable. The rescaled variable for media freedom did not, however, yield meaningful results.
Similarly, we surmise that coding the regions according to the balance of power between political and economic elites (the State Capture, Predatory State, and Competitive Market coding) posed methodological challenges that make testing this theory quite diffi cult. Thus, although this analysis was not able to demonstrate such a link, perhaps future studies will be able to show how the business-state relationship is related to corruption. Our application of the political theory laid out in Kang's Crony Capitalism does provide some interesting insights into the Russian situation, however. Most importantly, the comparison suggests that the Russian state cannot go too far in attacking the business community because Russian big business is highly concentrated. An all-out attack on business by the state would have harmful political and economic consequences for Russia. Putin and Russia would pay a high price if he were to follow such an aggressive strategy.
RUSSIA IN THE GLOBAL CONTEXT
Many of the dynamics fueling corruption in Russia are similar to those found in other transition countries. Like those countries, Russia's transition from communism has bequeathed poorly trained, though relatively small, bureaucracies and a lack of clarity in offi cial rules and structures, which create opportunities for corruption. Russia has also shared with other countries in the region a climate of uncertainty, which shortens the time horizons of public offi cials and encourages self-regarding rather than public-regarding behavior. 63 Further, the transition has entailed dismantling Soviet control structures-principally, the Communist Party and internal security services-without the timely establishment of effective new ones, leaving a vacuum of accountability into which nomenklatura networks and new economic elites have secured positions of dominance. For different reasons, this pattern was arguably more pronounced in Russia than in other transitional countries to its west. The vacuum of accountability was less pronounced in Central and Eastern Europe where a wide range of social groups and political movements shaped the transition and generated new mechanisms of political accountability. In the countries of the newly sovereign states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) besides Russia, by contrast, the old elites maintained a degree of control but operated with greater impunity, because Moscow no longer served as a check. 64 These differences show up in the average corruption perception scores for the two regions: in 1999 perception data, the CIS region ranked as the most corrupt with a score of .68 on a scale of 0 to 1 with 1 being the highest, whereas Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltics, with a score of .43, ranked better than Latin America, subSaharan Africa, and South Asia. 65 While predatory bureaucracies, a lack of clarity in rules and structures, a climate of uncertainty, and weakened accountability structures characterize the transition countries, many of these attributes apply to countries in other regions. The dynamics fueling corruption in the Russian regions, we would argue, are not unique or relevant only to other transition countries. Rather, similar forces are often present in countries that are not in the midst of a transition, although their particular confi guration and manifestation vary. While understanding the importance of examining the dynamics and attributes of corruption in each country, we believe the lessons from this study can be useful in other analyses.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR ANTICORRUPTION POLICY
The fi ndings of this article have clear implications for how Russia should address its corruption problem. The message is that corruption in Russia is fueled by the size of its particular kind of government and by the level of development. Within each region, the amount of corruption increases as the number of bureaucrats grows and per capita income decreases. Russian policymakers can therefore work to reduce corruption by scaling back, effectively reforming, or decentralizing bureaucracies and by promoting economic development. Lydia Segal's insights from her examination of America's public schools are relevant to our discussion of bureaucracies. She fi nds that large, centralized bureaucracies have been a breeding ground for corruption in school districts, despite the many controls in place. While Russia's bureaucracy is not large by international standards, Segal's analysis suggests that controlling corruption requires restructuring the system to push power down to appropriate levels and infusing the systems with a different balance of performance and compliance accountability. One way of restructuring the system would be to segment large bureaucracies into semiautonomous units whose performance can be easily measured rather than into divisions based on function (such as personnel, procurement, and so forth). The former corresponds to Oliver Williamson's proposed multidivisional or "M-Form" organization, which he claims will outperform the more traditional unitary or "U-Form" organization. 66 This kind of restructuring could be benefi cial in Russia.
Since the level of corruption drops as regions develop economically, another implication from our analysis is that Russia can reduce corruption by encouraging economic development outside of the key centers of Moscow and St. Petersburg. Unfortunately, the trend line is not optimistic here; according to economist Philip Hanson, "Regional inequality increased from 1992 through 1998, dropped after the crisis of August 1998, and has on balance increased since 1999, but without a clear trend." 67 A greater focus on regional development could have a benefi cial impact by reducing levels of corruption.
This analysis suggests that many current explanations of the situation in Russia are missing the real story. By focusing so much attention on such particular problems of business-state relations as the fate of Khodorkovsky and his Yukos company, Western politicians, the popular press, and some academic observers are overlooking the corruption that pervades the entire system. Structural forms of corruption are not greatly affected by the fate of one businessman or the Kremlin's current political strategy, so a real analysis of anticorruption policies needs to focus elsewhere.
Even though Putin set up a presidential commission to combat corruption on November 24, 2003, his efforts to address the issue will have little impact as long as his administration does not focus more on 66 See Segal (fn. 31), 170-76. 67 real reform of the bureaucracy and regional development. Thus, for all his extensive plans for overhauling the Russian bureaucracy prepared at the beginning of his fi rst term, implementation of these plans has languished. Current Russian policy is not aimed at reducing corruption in a real way; rather, by allowing the bureaucracy to block reform and failing to counteract increasing inequality, it leaves in place conditions that may make the situation even worse.
